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Abstract: Articulation of collective bargaining has been deeply modified both in Spain and in 
France in recent years. This study outlines and compares the decentralising process undergone by both 
countries in a context of broader changes in industrial relations in Europe. For decades, both the Span-
ish and French systems were based on the sectoral bargaining level, which provided a certain degree 
of equalization to working conditions within every sector, even though historical factors have led to 
differing evolutions of the two systems. The decentralising of collective bargaining in favour of the 
enterprise level began timidly in France in 1982 but the real legislative revolution in French collective 
bargaining occurred in 2004 and 2008. Today, enterprise collective agreements may “revoke” conditions 
established by a sectoral collective agreement. This is also the case in Spain, deriving from two more 
recent reforms (2011 and 2012), but, despite strong parallels between both countries, there are also clear 
differences regarding how these changes are being applied.
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1. Introduction
Collective bargaining is a key instrument in defining working conditions in Europe. Institutions 
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) argue that collective bargaining not only provides 
a means of determining wages and working conditions, it also enables employers and workers to define 
the rules governing their relationship. Therefore, collective bargaining may be advantageous for both 
workers and employers. For workers, it ensures adequate wages and working conditions that may not be 
achieved through individual negotiation, providing them with a “collective voice”. It also offers workers 
control over decisions regarding personnel and fair distribution of gains resulting from increases in tech-
nology and productivity. For employers, collective bargaining contributes to industrial peace, helping to 
stabilize industrial relations. Furthermore, employers may also address the need for change in order to 
facilitate modernisation and restructuring (ILO).
Moreover, collective agreements have been defined as key tenets of democracy and essential 
means by which workers may balance bargaining power in employment relations and negotiate im-
provements in working conditions (Hayter, 2011). However, power balancing is not homogeneous at all 
bargaining levels. Clearly, in most cases of enterprise and lower-level bargaining, the imbalance favours 
the employer. Therefore, the decentralization of collective bargaining has been a long-standing aspira-
tion in certain sectors—an aspiration that has gained support due to the current economic crisis, which, 
according to the European Commission (2010), is an unprecedented challenge for European industrial 
relations systems. Hayter (2011) reported that collective bargaining is seen from certain sectors as an 
expense and an obstacle to the flexible adjustment of enterprises and the smooth functioning of labour 
markets. This has led to policy advice calling for the weakening of collective bargaining rights and the 
decentralization of collective bargaining. Similarly, in the Athens Manifesto, the European Trade Union 
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Confederation (ETUC, 2011) condemned the hostile attitudes of European institutions and many Euro-
pean governments towards wage indexation and centralized bargaining in general.
Nevertheless, at European and national levels, social partners accept that the development of 
bargaining at an enterprise level is, to a certain extent, useful for introducing new forms of internal flex-
ibility that must be adopted in order for enterprises to adapt to changing economic realities. Collective 
agreements cover new issues such as restructuring, competitiveness and access to training, and are appli-
cable to new categories of employees, for example agency workers (European Commission, 2006). The 
European Commission (2006) stated that these agreements are important tools to adjust legal principles 
to specific economic situations and particular circumstances of specific sectors.
This paper aims to compare the collective bargaining reform processes in two European coun-
tries: France and Spain. The final objective of both of these countries is similar—to decentralize col-
lective bargaining and thereby increase the role of enterprise agreements. However, the two countries 
are conducting this process in very different ways that will undoubtedly lead to distinct outcomes. Over 
recent years, French collective labour law has gone through profound transformations, affecting collec-
tive bargaining regulations as well as related institutions such as worker representation in the enterprise 
and representativity. All of this reform has aimed to adapt legislation to the needs created by a final 
objective: to increase the centrality of enterprise collective agreements. This has been carried out by 
rearticulating sectoral and enterprise agreements and expanding the content of the same through the im-
plementation of bargaining obligations for a number of issues. According to some authors, this evolution 
has been progressive and employers are not demanding crucial changes permitted by the new legislation 
in order to maintain a certain balance within the industrial relations system (Ray, 2008).
The case of Spain is significantly different. The decentralization of collective bargaining has been 
an on-going demand of employers, who have been particularly insistent over the past four years. This 
demand has been introduced extensively in collective bargaining reform which was passed in 2011, al-
though some changes along this line had already been adopted in June of 2010. The most recent reform 
to date (February 2012) has followed along the same lines. It is clearly too early to fully evaluate the 
consequences of these changes but many of them are beginning to reveal themselves.
This study aims to provide clarification regarding the changes occurring in European systems of 
industrial relations by presenting two relevant examples.
2. Reforms in France: progressive reinforcement of collective bargaining at the enterprise level
In France, the number of reforms concerning collective bargaining has been so high over the last 
decade that already in 2004 Teyssié claimed that a completely new law on collective bargaining had 
emerged.
The reinforcement of collective bargaining against laws and regulations began in 1982, when the 
so-called Auroux laws1 were passed. Not only did they create new spaces for collective bargaining, but 
they also introduced the first rules on decentralization after decades of a strongly centralized bargaining 
structure. Before 1982, only legal minima were contemplated, referred to in France as “social public 
order”. This meant that collective agreements could only improve conditions regulated by the law, not 
worsen them. The Auroux laws introduced the “revocation” concept in France, implying that: (1) an 
agreement may establish worse conditions than those established by the law and (2) that a lower bar-
gaining level agreement may establish worse conditions than those established at a higher level (e.g. an 
enterprise agreement as compared to a sectoral agreement). However, the possibilities of “revocation” 
provided by the Auroux laws were very limited and only affected a very specific issue: overtime.
During the 1980s and 1990s, regulations remained considerably stable, but over the last decade, 
changes have been quite profound. A Common Position on ways to strengthen collective bargaining 
1 Law of 4 August 1982 concerning employee rights in the enterprise; Law of 28 October 1982 on the development 
of personnel representation institutions; and in particular, Law of 13 November 1982 on collective bargaining and collective 
conflict solving.
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was signed on July 16th of 2001 by the five trade unions recognized as representative at the intersectoral 
level and of the principal employer organisations. The Common Position requested additional space for 
collective bargaining and demanded complementarity between legislation and collective bargaining. 
Nevertheless, more serious reforms did not appear until 2004 and 2008.
2.1. Content expansion at the enterprise level and its articulation at the sectoral level 
The first major reform in collective bargaining was introduced by Act No. 2004-391 of 4 May 
2004 on lifelong vocational training and social dialogue. The final goal of the Act was to place enterprise 
agreements at the centre of the collective bargaining system (Souriac, 2005). The Act had three main 
objectives: to change rules on the conclusion of the agreements, to transform the articulation and to 
mitigate the effects of the lack of trade union representatives in enterprises2.
In regards to articulation, there were three main novelties introduced by the Act of 4 May 2004:
—   sectoral agreements could include provisions that were less favourable to workers as com-
pared to those resulting from agreements with wider territorial or functional fields. Neverthe-
less these wider-scope agreements could prohibit such “revocations”.
—   enterprise agreements could contain provisions that were less favourable to workers as com-
pared to those resulting from sectoral agreements. The Law also permitted negotiators at the 
sectoral level to impose bans on enterprise negotiators in regards to these “revocations”. Addi-
tionally, in this case, some issues were legally excluded from the “revocations”. These issues 
included minimum wages, professional classification and collective guarantees on comple-
mentary social protection and mutual funds for professional training. 
—   enterprise agreements could develop the application or they could “revoke” provisions in-
cluded in the Labour Code. Until 2004, this power had been reserved to sectoral or broader-
scope agreements.
The next (and, to date, the last) step was the passing of Law 2008-789 of 20 August 2008 on the 
reform of social democracy and working time. This Law was in line with the previous act, permitting 
“revocations” for a list of issues regarding working time. Like the Act of May 2004, “revocations”, re-
garding less favourable conditions, could be established both by enterprise and sectoral agreements to 
those of higher level or wider application. However, there is a substantial difference in these laws: from 
2008 on, the sectoral collective agreements can no longer ban “revocations” to their regulations con-
cerning most aspects of working time resulting from enterprise or narrower-scope agreements. Certainly 
these rules affect limited issues, but, according to some authors, the foundations were created in order to 
broaden the scope of such provisions in the near future (Barthélemy and Cette, 2010).
While articulation has generated intense debate in France –as well as in other European coun-
tries–, the progressive consolidation of the enterprise as the central level of bargaining through manda-
tory content has not been as widely noticed. Legislature, however, has consistently attributed the regula-
tion of numerous issues to enterprise agreements. These functions are not considered to be a possibility 
–always existing as a result of the parties’ freedom of to negotiate– but rather, an obligation.
The Auroux Laws were pioneering in establishing bargaining obligations. They have been widely 
extended over the past three decades. However, it should be noted that bargaining obligations do not 
necessarily imply agreement obligations. 
As for the frequency of bargaining, some regulations demand yearly negotiations on certain is-
sues, while in other cases they may be tri-annual.
In order to understand the bargaining obligation dimension as a whole, it is necessary to briefly 
list the issues that must be negotiated at the enterprise level:
2 It should be noted that in France, trade union representatives have traditionally been the subjects that negotiated at 
the enterprise level.
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—   effective wages, including the goal of eliminating any wage differences between men and 
women.
—   working time and its distribution, including paid holidays.
—   workplace preventive management.
—   professional equality between men and women, particularly in regards to access to employ-
ment, training and professional advancement, working conditions in general and reconcilia-
tion between work and family life.
—   exercising the freedom of expression within the enterprise.
—   senior worker positions, specifically, parties must negotiate their access to jobs, maintenance 
of them and access to training. In this case there is not only a bargaining obligation but also a 
concluding obligation.
—   professional insertion of disabled workers and, specifically, access to jobs, training, profes-
sional advancement, working conditions and disability sensitization of other workers.
—   complementary social previsions if they are not negotiated at the sectoral level and wage sav-
ing systems.
—   reconciliation between professional career and trade union activities.
Similarly, the parties are obliged to collectively examine the employment situation in the en-
terprise and, more specifically, the number of workers with low wages, the number of temporary and 
agency workers and annual or long-term job prevision in the enterprise.
In addition to bargaining obligations, the French Labour Code requires that enterprise agreements 
include the development of a large number of regulations, even though sectoral agreements may also 
intervene, which contributes to helping enterprise agreements gaining weight in the bargaining system. 
Furthermore, in many cases, enterprise agreements may “revoke” regulations established by the Code 
itself, decisively contributing to the deregulation of working conditions and to the individualisation of 
industrial relations, as a consequence of the limited bargaining capacity of trade union representatives, 
particularly in small enterprises. The Labour Code calls for the intervention of enterprise agreements in 
numerous issues related to working time and working time distribution (night work, overtime for full- 
and part-time workers, forewarning in the case of working time distribution modifications for part-time 
workers, modifications in daily rest, regulations on resting time corresponding to part-time workers, in-
troduction of shift replacement teams, regulations on seasonal work, creation of a working/holiday time 
account, “revoking” of the general principle of two consecutive holidays per week for workers under 18, 
allowing workers under 18 to work on bank holidays, postponing paid holidays including to the follow-
ing year). In addition, enterprise agreements may also intervene on other issues such as the regulation 
of trade union freedoms in the enterprise, certain disabled worker aspects, trial period regulations, in-
demnity reduction due to the termination of a temporary contract, and certain issues regarding training.
2.2. Accompanying reforms: representing and representativity at enterprise level 
Two particularly problematic issues were found in regards to the planned decentralization of col-
lective bargaining: on the one hand, worker representation within the enterprise and rules on conclusion 
of agreements and, on the other hand, serious defects affecting the fixing of representativity. Worker 
representation has a dual channel structure, as there are both elected representatives and trade union rep-
resentatives. Nevertheless, collective bargaining at the enterprise level has always corresponded in large 
part to trade union representatives. However, the fact is that trade unions have a considerably limited 
presence in small and medium sized enterprises, so that the lack of a union opposing party to the employer 
is a frequent reality. The laws from 4 May 2004 and 20 August 2008 established subsidiary sets of rules 
allowing parties other than union representatives to negotiate at an enterprise level, thus ensure that there 
are parties capable of negotiation. Such parties include elected representatives and mandated employees.
In addition, the Act of 4 May 2004 introduced profound reforms on the validity of enterprise 
agreements. Previously, the signature of a single trade union irrespective of its representativity in the en-
terprise was sufficient to make an agreement applicable to all workers in the enterprise. This possibility 
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had been strongly questioned, as the legitimacy of the labour signing party to bind all workers was, in 
many cases, far from being accepted, particularly at the time when enterprise agreements “revocations” 
were accepted. In fact, the regulations from 2004 were not very demanding, as legitimation was nega-
tively, not positively created: agreements didn’t require a majority but rather, a lack of opposition from 
trade unions representing the majority of workers. These regulations were improved by the Law of 20 
August 2008 requiring a certain supporting force to the agreement, although this force need not neces-
sarily be the majority. The objective is to reinforce the questioned legitimacy of enterprise agreements 
due to a lack of representativity of the signing trade union or unions.
The second problem relates to rules on representativity. The representativity system was established 
in France in 1966 and had remained unchanged until 2008, despite multiple attempts at reforming it. Per-
sisting doubts regarding the actual representativity of trade unions recognised as such were a long time 
burden to the development of collective bargaining. The 2008 reform turned the rules on determining 
representativity upside down: top to bottom legitimation became bottom to the top, i.e. from the enterprise 
to the national and intersectoral level. Prior to 2008, trade unions meeting certain undefined criteria (es-
sentially to have sufficient members, receive enough fees, gain their independence, have a certain antiquity 
and be influential in their field) at the national and intersectoral level, were conferred representativity in 
every enterprise in the country. However, upon application of legislation from 2008, election results at 
every bargaining level are considered –as well as other criteria– in order to determine who is representative 
at that level. As a result of certain concrete regulations, the five trade unions recognised as representative in 
2008, despite changes that have maintained their overall status, as well as two other unions, are likely to be 
recognised as representative3. Consequently, in the near future, few changes are anticipated, leading to the 
suspicion that new rules have been excessively tailor-made to the previously representative.
In any case, these reforms have been instrumental in adapting regulations to the ultimate goal of 
orienting the French legislative initiatives regarding collective labour law. This final objective consists of 
strengthening enterprise bargaining both by developing it but also, to the detriment of sectoral bargaining.
3. Reforms in Spain: an attempt to introduce accelerated changes
The present structure of collective bargaining in Spain is the result of a process in which histori-
cal factors are of great importance. These historical elements and the fact that regulations regarding the 
articulation of agreements are unnecessarily complicated, has led to an extremely complex system.
Collective bargaining as a system, as in other European countries, was created in the early 1980s, 
after the passing of the Workers’ Statute (1980). The freedom of social actors to choose a bargaining 
unit was then recognized. However, this rule created conflicts, as more than one agreement could be ap-
plicable to a group of labour relationships. Thus rules had to be created in order to solve these conflicts. 
In this point, Spanish law differs significantly from French law. In France, such conflicts were tradition-
ally solved by the favour principle. But in Spain, a general principle of chronological preference was 
adopted, so that the agreement to be applied was that which had been first signed, irrespective of the 
conditions contained in the different conflicting agreements. Nevertheless, lower-level agreements that 
improved the conditions of higher-level accords were always generally accepted. 
These rules led to a certain degree of fossilization of bargaining units, as the chronological preference 
made it extremely difficult to create new units. In addition, bargaining units were frequently derived from 
labour regulations dating back to the Franco era, as those units covered a territorial and sectoral regulatory 
field that were previously covered by Francoist labour regulations (identification of sectors and subsectors 
on a provincial basis). Moreover, jurisprudence has always tended to protect previously-created units.
The structure of collective bargaining became even more complicated after a reform that occurred 
in 1994. This reform, as well as other subsequent ones (1997, 2011 and 2012), was introduced via a de-
plorable legislative technique, through the addition of new paragraphs to article 84 of the Workers’ Stat-
3 The Law of 20 August 2008 establishes a very long transitory period (generally until mid-2013 and in some cases until 
2017) during which the reform is to be progressively applied. Consequently, the final picture of representativity is not yet apparent.
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ute. These new paragraphs were in some cases contradictory –in their philosophy and sometimes even in 
their literality– to the previous regulations that remained unchanged. This technique, defined as alluvial, 
has been strongly criticized (Cruz Villalón, 2007). The aim of the reform, which was demanded by the 
Catalan and the Basque nationalist parties, was to enable the creation of industrial relations frameworks 
in autonomous regions, which was hindered by the “occupation” of bargaining units by national sectoral 
collective agreements. However, the new regulations permitted any agreement at the supra-enterprise 
level to affect a higher-level agreement. In fact, these regulations invigorated provincial sectoral agree-
ments, which became the most common bargaining units until 2011, when said affecting agreements 
were limited to the regional (Autonomous Communities) level, so that provincial agreements could no 
longer regulate matters regulated by higher-level agreements.
At the same time, the 1994 reform introduced the possibility that an agreement at the enterprise 
level could establish that salaries set by the sectoral agreement were not to be applied if certain condi-
tions regarding economic difficulties of the enterprise were met. Likewise, an agreement between worker 
representatives and employers could change working conditions established in the sectoral agreement. 
In this case, the verification of certain circumstances was also required.
These regulations remained essentially unchanged until the passing of a very significant reform in 
June 2011. In fact, the main employers’ association had repeatedly demanded a relaxation of the norms 
on articulation of collective agreements in order to allow for a wider breadth in agreements at the enter-
prise level. 
These demands were broadly incorporated into the Royal Legislative Decree 7/2011, of 15 June, 
on Collective Bargaining Reform. This decree, passed by the Spanish Government and subsequently 
approved by Parliament, introduced crucial changes in the articulation of collective bargaining. Article 
84.2 of the Workers’ Statute stipulated that the application of working condition regulations established 
in an enterprise agreement would have priority over those working condition regulations established at 
the sectoral level for certain issues, including:
—   the amount of the basic salary and extra allowances; allowances related to the company’s situ-
ation and results included.
—   the payment or compensation for extra working hours and specific shift work payment.
—   working time and working time distribution; regulations on shift work and annual holiday 
planning.
—   enterprise adaptation to the professional classification of the worker system.
—   enterprise adaptation to various aspects of the types of contract to be used.
—   and measures employed to reconcile work, family and personal life.
Clearly, enterprise agreements can affect (e.g. regulate in less favourable terms for workers) sec-
toral agreements in terms of various areas. Sectoral agreements shall no longer establish the level at 
which working conditions are primarily negotiated. It is impossible to ignore the likely consequences 
of this change in terms of working conditions in Spain. Needless to say, these new regulations turn the 
priority-in-time rule as a plurality of agreements’ solving rule into an empty clause.
Article 84.2 of 2011 allowed for the possibility that an agreement, at the national or regional 
(Autonomous Community) level, would not permit such “derogations”. However, as these agreements 
had to be necessarily negotiated at the top levels by representative employer associations (which are 
those that had, for a long time, pressured for the reform) and representative trade unions, this appeared 
to be unlikely. It should be highlighted however, that the social partners maintained the possibility of 
articulate bargaining from the sectoral level. The Decree-Law 3/2012 of 10 February and Law 3/2012 
of 8 July removed any possibility of social partners articulating bargaining by forcing them to accept 
the priority given to the enterprise level, in all cases. The 2012 reform also introduced very significant 
changes: to a large extent, it facilitated opt-outs and strongly limited applicability of collective agree-
ments after their expiration and during renewal negotiations.
Reform implies a serious risk of collective bargaining atomization, as well as wage dispersal, 
making it difficult to maintain sectoral base wages and, consequentially, resulting in a generalized wage 
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decrease as has already been shown (ILO 2013). It enables different enterprises in the same sector to 
compete by worsening working conditions in general and wage conditions, specifically.
4. Conclusions
The study and comparison of the French and Spanish cases leads to numerous conclusions that 
should be considered.
First, the French and Spanish collective bargaining systems are not substantially different. For 
decades, both were based on the sectoral bargaining level, which provided a certain degree of equaliza-
tion to working conditions within every sector. Until recently, enterprise collective agreements existed 
almost exclusively in large enterprises and aimed to improve wages and working conditions as stipu-
lated by the sectoral agreement.
However, historical factors have led to differing evolutions of the two systems. In post-World War 
II France, the favour principle was enshrined as a “social public order” principle, admitting no exceptions 
and establishing that no lower-level agreement could contain less favourable conditions than those corre-
sponding to higher-level agreements. This was fine-tuned by the gradual introduction of other possibilities, 
based on which enterprise agreements could “adapt” sectoral regulations to the needs of the enterprises.
And in Spain, the structure of collective bargaining has been strongly conditioned by forty years 
of Francoist dictatorship, during which time trade unions were banned and collective bargaining (in 
terms of article 4 of the ILO Convention number 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargain-
ing), did not exist. However, clandestine trade unions developed a certain activity within the compulsory 
labour structures of the State. This, as well as the territorial and sectoral structure of Francoist labour 
regulations, influenced the development of the collective bargaining structure during the 1980s. This 
structure was strongly modified, as of 1994, with the so-called sectoral decentralising of collective 
bargaining. The decentralization was very strong, but it essentially remained within the sectoral level, 
reaching the enterprise level in a limited fashion (only under certain circumstances –namely, economic 
difficulties of the enterprise–).
One very clear difference between France and Spain is evident in regards to the development of 
enterprise collective bargaining through the expansion of its content. French legislature has created a 
large number of the so-called “bargaining obligations”, e.g. the identification of fields in which nego-
tiating at enterprise level became compulsory on a regular time basis (1 to 3 years) over the past thirty 
years (but especially during the last decade). Although the results of bargaining obligations have been 
less satisfactory than expected, they have nevertheless contributed to the spread of the enterprise agree-
ment content. However, in Spain no such bargaining obligations have been established and therefore, the 
contents of enterprise agreements remains extremely poor and is rarely innovative.
As for the decentralising of collective bargaining in favour of the enterprise level, this began 
timidly in France in 1982 with the Auroux laws, which allowed for “revocations” in a particular issue 
(overtime). However, the real legislative revolution in French collective bargaining occurred in 2004 
and 2008, with the creation of two closely-linked reforms. As a result of these reforms, today, enterprise 
collective agreements may “revoke” conditions established by a sectoral collective agreement (only if 
the latter has not banned it, which is quite often the case). But for many issues regarding working time 
and working time distribution, this banning has no longer been possible, since 2008.
The Spanish reforms are much more recent (2011 and 2012). They enable enterprise agreements 
to “revoke” conditions established by sectoral agreements for a large number of issues (wages, work-
ing time and working time distribution, overtime, professional classification, etc.). Their results, though 
highly predictable, remain to be seen.
The evolution of both the Spanish and the French collective bargaining systems, and specifically, 
their very recent developments, are meaningful examples and are indicative of very profound reforms 
made in European industrial relations that will undoubtedly occur over the coming years. A very clear 
trend to re-individualise working relationships may be seen, which may easily lead to the loss of ac-
quired rights and the worsening of working conditions throughout Europe.
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Despite strong parallels between both countries, there are also clear differences regarding how 
these changes are being applied. In the French case, changes are being implemented slowly and the ef-
fects of each implemented change may be evaluated to some degree prior to introduction of the subse-
quent change. Furthermore, employers and their associations are being quite cautious in order to prevent 
system destabilization from occurring due to the forced change. In Spain, however, the instigators of 
these changes want them to be applied very rapidly, leading to potentially devastating effects on the 
bargaining system.
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